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This market has settled: RESOLVED

Settled on March 25, 2026

politics Settled

Will there be between 0 and 10 average daily transits of the Strait of Hormuz on March 31?

Will there be between 0 and 10 average daily transits of the Strait of Hormuz on March 31? Odds: 69.0% YES on Polymarket. See live prices and trade this market.

Strait of Hormuz Transit Market Analysis

Current Odds

PlatformYesNoVolumeTrade
Polymarket69.0%31.0%$99KTrade on Polymarket

Market Analysis

The market is currently pricing a 69% probability that daily transits through the Strait of Hormuz will remain between 0-10 on March 31, 2026, reflecting elevated geopolitical risk in the Middle East but not priced for catastrophic closure. This matters because the Strait handles roughly 20-25% of global oil trade, making transit disruptions a critical economic indicator tied to regional conflict escalation, sanctions regimes, and energy security.

The bull case for the YES outcome rests on historical resilience: despite multiple crises—the 2019 tanker attacks, 2020 Soleimani assassination, recent Israeli-Iranian escalations—the Strait has remained substantially open with average daily traffic in the 20-30+ vessel range. Even during heightened tensions, complete closure is rare and brief. The 69% odds suggest the market views current conditions as manageable through March 2026, assuming no major new conflict (Israel-Iran escalation, direct U.S.-Iran confrontation) or dramatic sanctions enforcement changes. Additionally, economic incentives for all parties to maintain some level of trade flow remain strong—Iran needs revenue, Gulf exporters need buyers, and global energy markets cannot absorb a sustained shutdown.

The bear case for YES (betting on fewer than 10 transits) hinges on specific catalysts: an Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear or military facilities, a U.S. military escalation following proxy attacks, or Iranian retaliation triggering a shipping blockade. The January 2025 political transitions in the U.S. administration could shift Iran policy dramatically; if new sanctions or military posturing emerges in 2025-2026, shipping insurance costs and insurance availability could make transit economically unviable even without physical closure. Recent attacks on commercial shipping by Houthi forces demonstrate asymmetric disruption capacity below conventional warfare. Key watch dates include any U.S. policy announcements on Iran (expected within 100 days of inauguration), JCPOA-related developments, and responses to regional proxy activities.

Traders should monitor vessel tracking data (available via MarineTraffic, Lloyd’s List) to detect subtle disruption trends before March 2026, track oil price correlations as a leading indicator of closure risk, and watch for changes in insurance premiums and Strait-related geopolitical statements from U.S., Israeli, and Iranian officials. The 31% short odds suggest meaningful tail risk is being priced in; any major Middle East escalation in 2025 would likely shift this market sharply toward YES.

Frequently Asked Questions

What counts as a “transit” in this market—does it include all vessel types equally?

The market definition typically counts commercial vessels transiting in either direction; clarify with Polymarket’s official rules whether tankers, cargo ships, and naval vessels are weighted equally or if certain categories are excluded.

How would a temporary closure (2-3 days) of the Strait affect the final settlement?

March 31 counts only that specific day’s transits, so brief closures earlier in March wouldn’t affect the outcome unless transit volumes remain depressed on the settlement date itself.

Is there a historical baseline for “normal” daily transits that establishes what 0-10 represents as abnormal?

Yes—pre-crisis averages run 20-30+ vessels daily; 0-10 transits would represent roughly a 50-75% reduction from baseline, indicating moderate to severe disruption rather than complete blockade.

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